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This paper challenges the prevalent notion that family-
owned firms are more risk averse than publicly owned 
firms. Using behavioral theory, we argue that for family 
firms, the primary reference point is the loss of their 
socioemotional wealth, and to avoid those losses, family 
firms are willing to accept a significant risk to their per-
formance; yet at the same time, they avoid risky business 
decisions that might aggravate that risk. Thus, we pro-
pose that the predictions of behavioral theory differ 
depending on family ownership. We confirm our 
hypotheses using a population of 1,237 family-owned 
olive oil mills in Southern Spain who faced the choice 
during a 54-year period of becoming a member of a 
cooperative, a decision associated with loss of family 
control but lower business risk, or remaining indepen-
dent, which preserves the family's socioemotional wealth 
but greatly increases its performance hazard. As shown 
in this study, family firms may be risk willing and risk 
averse at the same time.· 
Family firms are a significant economic force in the United 
States and worldwide. Despite their potential advantages, 
such as greater organizational commitment and an orientation 
toward the longer term, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999) warned that wealth concentration in a single 
firm leads to greater risk aversion in family firms, and in the 
aggregate, this desire to minimize business risk can have the 
side effect of impeding overall economic development. 
Morck and Yeung (2003)' echoing the predominant view, 
made a similar point, arguing that family business domination 
can retard economic growth, given that family firms are reluc-
tant to opt for potentially high-return alternatives because of 
their relatively undiversified ownership position. This simplis-
tic view does not take into account, however, that owners of 
family firms are concerned not only with financial returns but 
also with their socioemotional wealth through those firms. By 
socioemotional wealth we refer to non-financial aspects of 
the firm that meet the family's affective needs, such as iden-
tity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetua-
tion of the family dynasty. Using a socioemotional reference 
point, family firms are likely to place a high priority on main-
taining family control even if this means accepting an 
increased risk of poor firm performance, yet because they 
must also keep the firm from failing, they may also act more 
conservatively by avoiding business decisions that may 
increase performance variability. The possibility that family 
firms could be both risk willing and risk adverse hinges on 
distinguishing between two types or risk: performance haz-
ard risk and venturing risk. 
The first type of risk, performance hazard, concerns the 
potential for negative consequences associated with a deci-
sion choice (March and Shapira, 1987; Hoskisson, Hitt, and 
Hill, 1991; Shapira, 1992), which can be manifested in two 
ways. One is the probability of organizational failure or 
threats to survival, what Shapira (1992: 135) referred to as 
"the worst case scenario" (see also Fischhoff, Watson, and 
Hope, 1984). The second is the possibility of below-target 
performance, where the target for comparison may be the 
firm's past performance or the performance of other firms in 













Risks in Family-controlled Firms 
the industry (eyert and March, 1963). Family firms may be 
willing to incur a greater performance hazard, as evidenced 
by a greater probability of failure and below-target perfor-
mance, if this is what it takes to protect their socioemotional 
wealth. Hence, they are loss averse when it comes to 
threats to their socioemotional wealth (relinquishing family 
control) even if this means accepting a greater performance 
hazard. 
While both forms of performance hazard noted above (i.e., 
probability of failure and below-target performance) focus on 
the likelihood that bad things may happen, organizations may 
take risks hoping to improve their current situation. This sec-
ond type of risk, venturing, involves the search for alternative 
routines and opportunities when the firm is unhappy with the 
status quo, namely, when its performance falls below target 
(Bromiley, 1991). The search for new approaches, including 
new products or technologies, may raise organizational per-
formance, but it also increases the chance of unexpected 
outcomes, causing variance in performance (Wiseman and 
Bromiley, 1996). Greater variance in observed performance 
outcomes is often used as a proxy for an organization's 
desire to pursue promising projects with uncertain returns 
but with an upside potential to improve the firm's financial 
situation (Bowman, 1982, 1984; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 
1986, 1988; Bromiley, 1991; Miller, Wiseman, and Gomez-
Mejia, 2002) and is an indicator of venturing risk. Family firms 
may be less likely to make business decisions that increase 
performance variability even when they face disappointing 
(below-target) performance. Because their probability of fail-
ure is higher, they should be less willing to take on projects 
with high outcome variance that might further increase the 
firm's probability of failure. While family firms may avoid ven-
turing risks, they may be willing to incur the risk of greater 
performance hazard in order to preserve their socioemotional 
wealth. 
SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH AND BUSINESS RISKS 
While definitions of what constitutes a family firm vary, pri-
vately held businesses in which families play a significant 
ownership or managerial role represent at least 80 percent of 
all firms in the U.S. (Daily and Dollinger, 1992; Shanker and 
Astrachan, 1996; Beer, Drexler, and Faulkner, 1997), and in 
some sectors (such as construction, retail services, and 
wholesaling), the proportion is estimated to be as high as 99 
percent (James, 1999). Schulze et al. (2001) estimated that 
family influence is pervasive among the largest U.S. firms. 
They reported that in about 65 percent of firms with 1993 
revenues of over $5 million, at least 50 percent of the owner-
ship was concentrated in a single family. Likewise, Carsrud 
(1994) and Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003) 
reminded us that about 35 percent of Fortune 500 firms are 
largely controlled by family interests. International compar-
isons by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) sug-
gested that the diversified firm with atomistic ownership, 
which was the central concern of Berle and Means (1932) 
and much subsequent work by "managerialists" and agency 
writers, is almost absent in a world in which families directly 
or indirectly influence most economic activities. 
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The socioemotional wealth of family firms comes in a variety 
of related forms, including the ability to exercise authority 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003b)' the satisfaction of 
needs for belonging, affect, and intimacy (Kepner, 1983), the 
perpetuation of family values through the business (Handler, 
1990), the preservation of the family dynasty (Casson, 1999), 
the conservation of the family firm's social capital (Arregle et 
aI., 2005), the fulfillment of family obligations based on blood 
ties rather than on strict criteria of competence (Athanassiou 
et aI., 2002), and the opportunity to be altruistic to family 
members (Schulze et aI., 2003b). Losing this socioemotional 
wealth implies lost intimacy, reduced status, and failure to 
meet the family's expectations. 
Although it does not focus explicitly on family firms, a sepa-
rate stream of literature suggests that an important aspect of 
the socioemotional wealth of family businesses is that it ful-
fills the need for identification. Identification can be con-
strued as an individual's self-concept based on the social cat-
egories in which the person perceives him- or herself to 
belong (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Pratt (1998: 
172) noted that deep psychological gratification occurs when 
"an individual's beliefs about his or her organization become 
self-referential or self-defining." When much of an employ-
ee's self-concept is strongly tied to the firm's identity, he or 
she derives substantial non-economic benefits from member-
ship in such an organization (Ashforth and Mael, 1989, 1996; 
Schneider, Goldstein, and Smith, 1995). 
Organizational identification should be particularly salient in 
family firms, adding much to its socioemotional wealth. By 
definition, a family-owned firm provides a distinct self-defin-
ing role to its members based on family ties. Such an identifi-
cation exists outside the realm of purposeful organizational 
activities and, in fact, is seen as an overarching construct that 
solidifies and further defines what it means to be a family-
owned firm (Kets de Vries, 1993). In other words, the family 
employee's social status is closely tied to his or her employ-
er, and an enduring attachment means that self-concept and 
self-esteem are likely enhanced through long-term identifica-
tion with the firm that often bears the person's name (West-
head, Cowling, and Howorth, 2001). Thus the perpetuation of 
family emblems are at the core of what a family business 
identity represents (Littunen, 2003). 
All of the above arguments suggest that for family-owned 
firms, preserving the family's socioemotional wealth, which is 
inextricably tied to the organization, represents a key goal in 
and of itself. In turn, achieving this goal requires continued 
family control of the firm. Hence, independent of financial 
considerations, family-owned firms are more likely to perpet-
uate owners' direct control over the firm's affairs. Thus, other 
things being equal: 
Hypothesis 1: Family firms will exhibit a stronger preference to 
retain owner control of the organization than non-family firms. 
The family business literature suggests that the family's 
attachment to the organization is highest when the firm is 
owned and managed by the founding family and that it tends 
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to weaken as the firm transitions into subsequent genera-
tions (e.g., Mishra and McConaughy, 1999; Chua, Chrisman, 
and Sharma, 1999, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 
2003a). Schulze and colleagues (2003a) distinguished 
between a "controlling family owned firm," "sibling partner-
ship," and" cousins consortium." In the more advanced own-
ership stage, family influence becomes more dispersed or 
fractionalized, with a smaller average shareholding per per-
son. The family as a monolithic entity begins to lose its grip 
over the firm in later stages, and financial considerations of 
multiple stakeholders move to the forefront. 
Similar distinctions by family stage have been made by 
Athanassiou et al. (2002), Gersick et al. (1999). and Ward and 
Aronoff (1994), who argued that the degree of family identifi-
cation, influence, and personal investment in the firm 
decreases once the firm transitions from a founding-family-
firm status to other ownership configurations. Sirmon and 
Hitt (2003) suggested that the family's social capital that 
resides in the business, in terms of structural (network ties 
and configuration), cognitive (shared language and narratives). 
and relational (norms and values) components, is higher 
when the family and organizational domains overlap signifi-
cantly or are isomorphic, as they are in earlier ownership 
stages. A higher social capital should have a positive impact 
on a family's commitment to the firm in terms of the moral 
obligation to exercise strong influence (normative commit-
ment), recognition of the costs associated with leaving the 
firm (continuance commitment), and emotional bonds (affec-
tive commitment) (Meyer and Alien, 1997). When these con-
ditions are present (that is, in earlier ownership stages), the 
family should be more reluctant to relinquish control. 
The three family stages mentioned by various authors can be 
described as follows: founding-family-controlled and managed 
firms (first stage), ownership and management by extended 
family (second stage). and ownership by extended family, 
professionally managed firms (third stage). It seems reason-
able to expect that personal attachment to the firm, self-iden-
tification with the firm, the "utility generated by the ability to 
exercise authority" (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003a: 182), 
social capital and such-socioemotional wealth-should be 
stronger in the founding-family-controlled and managed firms 
(stage one) and that it should be relatively lower as the firm 
moves into later stages, namely, ownership and management 
by non-founding extended family (stage two) and ownership 
by extended family members who are not involved in the 
firm's management (stage three). Hence, independent of 
financial considerations, losses in socioemotional wealth 
should weigh less heavily on a family firm's willingness to 
give up control as it moves from stage one through stage 
three. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2: The stronger the role of the family, the more likely 
the firm is to strive to protect its socioemotional wealth, such that 
willingness to give up family control is lowest at the founding-family-
controlled and managed stage, moderate at the non-founding 
extended-family-owned and managed stage, and highest at the 
extended-family- owned and professionally managed stage. 
109/ASO, March 2007 
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Table 1 
Balancing Risks and Continued Family Control 
As table 1 shows in its summary of studies of risk in family 
firms, there is broad agreement that family firms tend to be 
more risk averse in their business decisions than non-family 
firms. The predominant theoretical explanation for this comes 
from some variant of agency theory (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-
Summary of Representative Studies Examining Business Risk in Family Firms 
Definition of 
Authors business risk Key measures Sample Results 
Donnelly (1964) Willingness to innovate Self-report Anecdotal Lower innovation in 
family firms 
Levinson (1983) Willingness to innovate Self-report Anecdotal Lower innovation in 
family firms 
Benson (1991) Willingness to innovate Self-report Anecdotal Lower innovation in 
family firms 
Daily & Dollinger Miles & Snow's Self-report 486 small manufactur- Family firms tend to 
(1991,1992) "prospector" ers in Indiana adopt a conservative 
strategy "defender" orienta-
tion and avoid 
growth-oriented 
strategies 
Galve-Gorriz & Risk exposure of Firm's rate of growth 81 non-financial firms Family firms limit 
Sala-Fumas owner's portfolio debt quoted in Spanish growth rates and 
(1996) stock market avoid debt 
Mishra & Risk exposure of Debt Business Week sample Founding-family-con-
McConaughy owner's portfolio of 1000 firms in 1987 trolled firms use less 
(1999) debt 
Morck, Strange- Investments in Research and Develop- Publicly traded Canadi- Heir-controlled firms 
land, & Yeung innovation ment (R&D) expendi- an firms controlled invest less in R&D 
(2000) tures by heirs than benchmark non-
heir-controlled firms 
of same age, size, 
and in same industry 
McConaughy, Risk exposure of Capital structure or the Biographical sketches Debt-to-asset ratio of 
Mathews, & owner's portfolio proportion of debt to of CEOs provided by founding-family-con-
Fialko (2001) equity Business Week in trolled firms less 
1997 than a third that of a 
matched sample of 
firms whose man-
agers are not family 
members 
Gomez-Mejia, Variation of perfor- Coefficient of variation 276 Spanish newspa- Family firms more likely 
Nunez-Nickel, & mance outcomes pers to terminate top 
Gutierrez (2001) executives when the 
coefficient of varia-
tion increases 
Athanassiou et al. Pursuit of high- Self-report 42 Mexican family busi- Family firms place 
(2002) risk/high-return nesses much higher impor-
strategies tance on survival and 
family employment 
opportunities than 
trying to maximize 
profitability or market 
returns 
Schulze, Lubatkin, Risk exposure of Debt-to-equity ratio, 3,860 firms in survey Family firms are more 
& Dino (2003a) owner's portfolio to growth rate of firm's by Arthur Andersen likely to use debt as 
unfavorable market market Center for Family the growth rate of 
conditions Business the firm's market 
increases 
Gomez-Mejia, Lar- Systematic (macroeco- Variability in firm's 253 publicly traded Family firms penalize 
raza-Kintana, & nomic or industry- stock market returns family-controlled non-family execu-
Makri (2003) wide forces) and firms tives in their pay as 
unsystematic (condi- firm risk increases 
tions unique to the 
firm) risk 
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Nickel, and Gutierrez, 2001; Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma, 
2003; Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri, 2003; Villa-
longa and Amit, 2006). Briefly, family principals have most of 
their wealth tied to one company and cannot easily diversify 
their portfolio. Hence, they largely depend on one organiza-
tion for their welfare, so that their risk is highly concentrated. 
In response to this vulnerability, family executives place a 
high value on avoiding business risk because the possibility 
of negative outcomes more than outweighs the benefits of 
any potential returns. But this widely held view does not con-
sider the possibility of socioemotional losses for family mem-
bers. Depending on the type of risk being considered, family 
firms could be both risk willing and risk averse at the same 
time. They might be willing to take risks that incur a perfor-
mance hazard but not be willing to take venturing risks. 
Performance hazard. A long stream of research that has 
flowed from Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory 
(Bowman, 1982, 1984; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1986, 
1988; Fiegenbaum, 1990) and Cyert and March's (1963) 
behavioral theory of the firm (e.g., Singh, 1986; Bromiley, 
1991; Miller and Chen, 2004) can help us understand why 
family firms may be loss averse and, hence, risk willing when 
it comes to decisions affecting their socioemotional endow-
ment, even if this may not be economically rational from a 
business risk standpoint. These behavioral perspectives relax 
the inflexible assumption from agency theory that decision 
makers hold consistent risk preferences and instead propose 
that decision makers take a contingency-based view to allow 
for the possibility of varied risk preferences, depending on 
the context being faced. 
According to behavioral theory, a decision maker's risk prefer-
ences change with the framing of problems. Problems are 
framed as either positive or negative using a reference point 
to compare anticipated outcomes from available options. 
Thus problems can be framed as a choice among potential 
gains or as a choice among potential losses. Behavioral theo-
ry predicts that decision makers prefer to avoid a loss even if 
this means accepting a higher risk; and hence, the "risk pref-
erences of loss-averse decision makers will vary with the 
framing of problems in order to prevent losses to accumulat-
ed endowment" (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998: 135). 
From this vantage point, risk bearing is subjective, represent-
ing perceived threats to a decision maker's endowment-
what the person believes is important to his or her welfare, is 
already accrued, and can be counted on. 
Applying the logic of behavioral theory, family firms are likely 
to frame relinquishing their socioemotional wealth as a cru-
cial loss and are thereby likely to accept threats to the firm's 
financial well being (i.e., a greater probability of failure and 
below-target performance) to prevent that loss. Thus, con-
trary to the conventional agency-based view, we suggest that 
family firms are loss averse with respect to socioemotional 
wealth and are willing to face a significant performance haz-
ard to preserve that wealth. This creates an apparent paradox 
in that organizational failure implies the loss of all socioemo-
tional wealth, yet this is the gamble that these family firms 
are willing to take, perhaps believing that this risk can be 
111/Asa, March 2007 
managed, hoping for the best, namely, continuity of the firm 
under the family's stewardship. This is consistent with March 
and Shapira's (1987) and Shapira's (1992) findings that execu-
tives often justify their risky decisions by expressing a belief 
that risk is not exogenous and can be managed. The preced-
ing arguments suggest the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: Family firms are more willing to accept a greater 
probability of organizational failure than non-family firms in order to 
retain family control. 
Hypothesis 3b.1: Family firms are more willing than non-family 
firms to accept below-target performance relative to their own past 
performance in order to retain family control. 
Hypothesis 3b.2: Family firms are more willing than non-family 
firms to accept below-target performance relative to the perfor-
mance of referent firms in order to retain family control. 
Venturing risks. The basic behavioral model proposes that 
organizations tend to initiate searches for alternative strate-
gies or routines (what we call venturing risks) when their per-
formance falls below their target or "aspiration" level, and 
the opposite is true when their performance is above this tar-
get. For instance, Singh (1986) argued that when faced with 
below-target performance, firms will pursue projects with 
higher outcome variance because projects with lower vari-
ance would most likely preserve below-target performance. 
Similarly, Wiseman and Bromiley (1996: 530) argued that 
"firms facing a loss context (where expected performance 
falls below performance targets) ... may opt for projects of 
higher risk where that higher risk translates into greater vari-
ance in project outcomes." Consistent with this view, man-
agers interviewed by Shapira (1992) and MacCrimmon and 
Wehrung (1986) reported that riskier choices that involve 
greater variance in expected results are more warranted 
when managers have the potential to fail to meet targets 
than when they are likely to meet their targets. 
Previous empirical studies by Bowman (1982, 1984), Fiegen-
baum (1990), Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1986, 1988)' and 
Bromiley (1991) used performance-variance measures of risk 
to support this basic model: organizations whose perfor-
mance falls below target tend to take on greater risk, and 
those whose performance is above target tend to take less 
risk. For underperforming firms, venturing behaviors that 
might increase performance variability may improve their 
chances of attaining their target. As noted earlier, targets 
may be set using the firm's past performance or the perfor-
mance of other similar firms in the industry. Hence, 
Hypothesis 4: There is a U-form relationship between distance from 
the aspiration level (either in terms of discrepancy from a historical 
performance target or the performance of referent firms) and perfor-
mance variance so that the latter increases as organizational perfor-
mance diverges from the aspiration level in either direction. 
March and Shapira (1987, 1992) provided further theoretical 
extensions of the basic behavioral model by making an 
important prediction concerning firms that perform below 
their aspiration level. They argued that firms face alternative 
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reference points, aspirational vs. survival, and the willingness 
to undertake projects with high outcome variance increases 
only when the former is most salient. As the firm approaches 
a situation in which the probability of business failure is high, 
the focus of attention then changes from reaching the aspira-
tion level to one of ensuring the firm's survival. Hence, the 
tendency to choose investments with high performance vari-
ance, as basic behavioral theory would suggest, is attenuated 
by a heightened awareness of danger when the probability of 
failure increases. This argument is similar to that of the 
"threat rigidity response" made by Staw, Sandelands, and 
Dutton (1981: 502), who proposed that risk taking decreases 
under threats to survival. 
Although the basic behavioral model-which predicts high 
performance variance for those below target and low perfor-
mance variance for those above target-has found over-
whelming empirical support in many studies, March and 
Shapira's extensions have received little attention. Miller and 
Chen (2004) in a recent study designed to meet this chal-
lenge, found, contrary to March and Shapira's prediction, that 
organizations showed increased performance variance as 
they neared bankruptcy. Miller and Chen suggested that this 
result might have been due to the nature of their sample 
(large publicly traded manufacturing firmsl. in which the limit-
ed liability feature of equity claims truncates the distribution 
of downside outcomes by transferring the risk of non-pay-
ment of debts from shareholders to creditors. In their words, 
"this feature provides an incentive to increase risk when a 
firm is near bankruptcy" (Miller and Chen, 2004: 111). In any 
event, there is a need to further test March and Shapira's 
propositions where this confounding effect is not present. 
This test also serves as a platform to examine the moderat-
ing role played by family ownership, as discussed in hypothe-
ses 6 and 7. Hence, following March and Shapira's exten-
sions of the basic behavioral model, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5: The higher the organization's probability of failure 
(i.e., as the threat to survival increases) the lower the performance 
variance. 
The above predictions apply to all firms, but family status 
should also exert an independent influence here. If family 
firms voluntarily choose to trade a greater probability of fail-
ure in exchange for preserving family control of the organiza-
tion (as per hypothesis 3al. and if a greater probability of fail-
ure is associated with lower performance variance (as per 
hypothesis 5l. then by logical extrapolation, March and Shapi-
ra's model would predict that family firms on average should 
exhibit lower performance variance. Thus, 
Hypothesis 6: Family firms will show lower performance variance 
than non-family firms. 
Continuing along the same vein, if family firms are more will-
ing to tolerate below-target performance as a condition of 
retaining control of the firm (as per hypothesis 3b.1 and 
3b.2), and because preserving that control is more salient to 
them than meeting a performance target, it seems reason-
able that they would avoid high-variance investments that 








might further jeopardize their self-chosen vulnerable position. 
In other words, rather than pursuing opportunities that may 
have upside and downside potential as the distance from the 
performance target grows, family firms would tend to remain 
steadfast in their position. Unconstrained by the need to 
safeguard a socioemotional endowment, non-family firms can 
be more single-minded in the search for and execution of 
high-performance-variance strategies as the gap between 
performance and the target widens. Another way of looking 
at this is that the type of risk a firm focuses on depends on 
family status. Non-family firms performing below target 
engage in projects with greater outcome variance (venturing 
risk) to avoid continued financial losses, as shown by Fiegen-
baum and Thomas (1988). Yet family firms are willing to 
accept below-target performance and a higher probability of 
failure (a performance hazard) to avoid socioemotional losses. 
Hence, we expect family firms to exhibit lower venturing risk 
as the distance to the performance target increases than 
non-family firms: 
Hypothesis 7: The relationship between the distance to the perfor-
mance target (either historical or relative to referent firms) and per-
formance variance is lower among family than non-family firms. 
METHODS 
Sample and Setting 
Our database contains information on all olive oil mills that 
have operated in the province of Jaen (Spain) during the peri-
od between 1944 and 1998. The mills extract and store virgin 
olive oil, with extraction being the fundamental activity. 
Olives are the sole raw material and critical resource for the 
operation of the mills, which requires no specialized work-
force. 
One thousand two hundred and thirty-seven firms (N = 
1,237) were considered as family owned at some point dur-
ing the 54-year time span, which is defined by government 
as all those in which a particular family has undivided proper-
ty rights over the mill's assets. This information, as noted 
below, was obtained from government mandated registries 
updated annually. Although detailed ownership percentages 
by individual parties are not available, for all those mills that 
are family owned, the registry (which collects these data 
once a year) identifies three mutually exclusive categories: (1) 
Mills that are owned and operated by the founding family. To 
be designated as such, two criteria must be met. First, at the 
time the report is filed, the family owners must be the same 
as those who appeared in the original title document. Sec-
ond, the original founders must still be physically and legally 
responsible for the firm. There were 1,086 firms at this stage 
at some point during 1944-1998; (2) Mills that are owned 
and managed by non-founding extended family. These are 
firms that are owned by relatives of the original founders and 
who hold top management positions in the firm under a 
"joint property" or "community property" legal status. 
Almost all of these firms have names such as "Brothers of," 
"Heirs of," or "Sons of," indicating the nature of blood ties 
between current owner managers and original founders. 
There were 241 firms at this stage at some point during 
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1944-1998; and (3) Mills that are owned by non-founding 
extended family members but that are managed by hired pro-
fessional executives. These non-family executives have oper-
ational responsibility for the firm on behalf of absentee family 
owners. There were 80 firms at this stage at some point dur-
ing 1944-1998. 
If the mill is not family owned (i.e., it does not fall into one of 
the three family ownership stages noted above), it is classi-
fied into one of two mutually exclusive categories: those that 
are corporations, owned by multiple non-related investors 
and run by professional managers (229 firms), or coopera-
tives (320 firms). For reasons discussed below, a firm's deci-
sion to become part of a cooperative is a unidirectional one: 
the choice faced by an independent firm (family-owned or 
corporate) at anyone point during the 54-year period is 
whether or not to become part of a cooperative; the coopera-
tive cannot "turn the clock back" and become a family or cor-
porate-owned firm. 
Joining a cooperative is a voluntary act on the part of the mill, 
so that the decision to join or remain autonomous rests 
entirely on the firm's owners. All mills have an equal chance 
of joining the coop, and upon signing the membership docu-
ments, the new member has the same rights and obligations 
as any other member. Except in some very unusual circum-
stances, the coop cannot deny entry to an independent mill 
that wishes to become part of the coop. In other words, the 
final decision to be "in or out" is taken by the mill, not the 
coop. There are two reasons for this. The first is that to be 
recognized as a coop and receive the substantial tax incen-
tives described below, Spanish legislation (known as Ley 
General de Cooperativas) explicitly requires a "voluntary and 
open membership" clause in the coop's constitution. This 
clause must clearly state that "this is a voluntary organiza-
tion, open to all persons able to use its services and willing 
to accept the responsibilities of membership, without gender, 
social, racial, political or religious discrimination." Spanish law 
makes it very explicit that the only "fair cause" to deny 
admission to a prospective member is when such a party will 
not contribute to the "corporate purpose" of the coop, for 
instance, an applicant who is in a different line of business 
than that of the coop. The coop rarely rejects an applicant. 
Even then, procedures are in place to protect the applicant 
from arbitrary judgments. If the board of the coop rejects an 
applicant's petition to join, the coop is required to provide a 
written report justifying the reason for the denial. The reject-
ed applicant can then appeal its case to the general assembly 
of all members, who might overturn the board's decision and 
approve the petitioner's request. As a last recourse, the peti-
tioner may file charges in court against the coop for failing to 
meet the "fair cause" rejection criterion. 
A second reason is that, legal issues aside, coops are inter-
ested in getting new members because they can secure 
more input (olives) and hence gain a competitive advantage 
in this commodity market. Due to non-compete agreements, 
to be discussed later, new entrants usually transfer property 
rights of the mill's plant and equipment to the coop. This 
allows the coop to process more olives, increasing the vol-















ume of oil that can be delivered to market. By doing so, the 
coop may also preempt competitors from gaining ground in 
the same location. And as long as the prospective entrant 
can bring new olive crops as inputs into the coop, the coop 
will benefit. The new entrant will be compensated in the 
same way as any other member, based on tons of olives 
delivered to the coop. Furthermore, new entrants are not 
required to pay an initiation fee, and contributions to cover 
the coop's administrative expenses are very modest, typical-
ly, six euros per ton of olives turned into the coop. Hence, 
affordability is not much of an issue here. 
The coop brings several financial advantages to its members. 
These are well known to the mill owners, most of whom live 
in small agricultural towns where this information is common 
knowledge. First, significant tax benefits accrue when 
becoming a member of the cooperative; thus there is a 
strong fiscal inducement to join. Cooperatives have enjoyed 
extensive tax benefits in Spain for the last 80 years. The 
most recent regulation concerning the tax status of coopera-
tives, known as Law 20, completely exempts coops from 
taxes during the first ten years, and after this grace period is 
over, they only pay 50 percent of the tax rate that an equiva-
lent non-coop organization would have to pay. The regional 
government also provides subsidies from time to time to the 
cooperatives to purchase equipment, facilities, chemicals and 
the like. The rationale for these subsidies is that it helps the 
cooperatives reduce unemployment in an area (Andalucia) 
that has traditionally suffered from a chronic unemployment 
problem. Second, the cooperative enjoys a substantial verti-
cal integration of inputs (olives), process (machinery, equip-
ment, and technology to transform olives into oil), and output 
distribution channels (to sell and deliver olive oil to various 
markets). It also promotes horizontal integration among input 
suppliers, who are also members of the coop. Third, because 
coops enjoy greater economies of scale than individual oil 
mills, they tend to be more efficient. Fourth, coops provide 
substantial technical, managerial, and marketing support to 
their members. Fifth, the coop generally provides its mem-
bers with access to better financing through alliances with 
local credit unions (or "Caja Rurales"). Family mills that 
decide to remain independent may be forced to depend 
exclusively on family savings as a source of capital. Sixth, the 
cooperative guarantees a price per ton of olives to its mem-
bers, who are compensated in direct proportion to the total 
weight of the olives they bring into the coop. Hence, price 
uncertainty, a major risk concern for commodity producers, is 
virtually eliminated. Seventh, the coop handles distribution 
and marketing of the product to external buyers, reducing the 
possibility that unforeseeable events (e.g., a machine break-
down) may retard scheduling and reduce profits. Lastly, given 
its larger size, the coop has greater bargaining power than do 
individual oil mills to secure more favorable terms from input 
suppliers (e.g., providers of fertilizers, equipment, and materi-
als) as well as buyers. 
In terms of our hypotheses, all of the benefits noted above 
should translate into a lower performance hazard for the olive 
oil mills that decide to join the coop. These are particularly 
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Non-compete agreements are explicitly 
outlined in the following legal documents 
issued by the Spanish government: Intro-
duction to Law of Cooperation 1942, Arti-
cle 10d of Cooperative Law of 1974, and 
Article 34, section 2e of Cooperative Law 
of 1987. 
Risks in Family-controlled Firms 
important in an industry in which there are many unforesee-
able factors, such as climate, diseases, and demand 
changes, that may have an unexpected negative effect on 
firm performance. Further, olive trees are a long-term invest-
ment: it may require ten or more years before they produce 
any yield, and hence financial returns lie in an unforeseeable 
future. 
Although a family-owned mill can greatly reduce its perfor-
mance hazard by voluntarily joining a cooperative, because of 
tax advantages, guaranteed minimum prices, technical sup-
port, and such, the family will also lose control of the firm. In 
terms of our theoretical model, this means that the family 
faces a stark choice of either reducing its performance hazard 
by joining the coop and losing family control of the firm or 
retaining full control of the mill, remaining independent but 
accepting a higher performance hazard by going it alone. 
There are five key reasons why a family-owned mill would 
have to relinquish control of the firm, and hence lose its 
socioemotional endowment, by joining the coop. The first 
two are legal, while the last three pertain to managerial 
issues. 
First, firms wishing to join a coop need to sign an exclusive 
membership agreement with one particular coop. The agree-
ment is irrevocable, so once this step is taken, the family 
firm cannot go back to being autonomous, permanently 
changing the family firm's legal standing from a privately 
owned independent firm to being a part of the cooperative. 
After joining, the family must abide by the conditions, rules, 
and directives imposed by the coop, including removal of the 
family name. 
Second, as a unit of the coop, the mill must turn in all of its 
produce to the coop and cannot search for alternative outlets. 
This non-compete agreement is explicitly codified in Spanish 
legislation, which demands that as a condition of joining the 
coop, the firm cannot conduct parallel activities that may 
pose a threat to the cooperative.' And although a mill is not 
forced to sell its plant and equipment to the coop as a condi-
tion of its membership, it cannot rent it or sell it to any other 
entity because this would be a violation of the non-compete 
clause. For this reason, in almost all cases in which a mill 
makes the decision to join the coop, it signs over property 
rights to the coop, selling its plant and equipment to the 
coop. This effectively handcuffs the family mill to the coop in 
a resource dependent relation. 
Third, corporate governance of the coop ensures that family 
influence completely vanishes, for all practical purposes. Sev-
eral governance features account for this. The coop appoints 
a chief executive officer (CEO)' who is a professional execu-
tive accountable to a board. The board, which is usually com-
posed of 8-10 members, is elected from the coop members, 
but no single firm can have more than one member on the 
board. Furthermore, an olive mill that has just joined a coop-
erative must wait at least a year before being able to place a 
representative on the governing board. Major decisions con-
cerning policy, rules and procedures, relations with external 
parties (such as the government and financial institutions), 















contractual obligations, and the like must be approved by the 
entire assembly, consisting of all members eligible to vote. 
Each family-owned mill that joins the coop can exercise one 
vote in the general assembly, the same as any other mem-
ber. This "one member one vote" rule applies to all firms 
that are part of the cooperative, regardless of size, wealth, 
local influence, or other idiosyncratic firm factors. Because 
each cooperative on average includes approximately 100 
members, the power that may be exercised by any particular 
family in the assembly is minimal, limited to a maximum of 
one vote. Simply put, by entering the coop, a family goes 
from enjoying total executive discretion in its old firm to a 
diluted power-sharing arrangement in which the family's 
voice and desires count the same as those of any other 
member with a right to vote. 
Fourth, unlike an independent mill, in which the family can 
unilaterally decide on the technology used, cultivation meth-
ods, quality features, the price at which it is willing to sell 
olives, the use of pesticides, management policies, and the 
like, by joining the coop, the firm must abide by the direc-
tives established by the coop's CEO, board, and general 
assembly. Lastly, the coop uses a team of inspectors (inter-
ventores in Spanish) to ensure that its mandates are fOllowed 
and that financial reports are in order. In summary, when a 
firm joins a coop, the identity and power that previously 
resided within the family that owned an individual oil mill 
must now be collectively shared by all other firms that form 
part of the coop. Hence, joining the coop represents a loss 
for the family firm in socioemotional terms. 
Data Sources 
The authors gathered all the data manually from government 
registries. Each olive oil mill and coop is required to file an 
annual report, as mandated by the Andalusian Regional Gov-
ernment, one of the main olive oil producing regions in the 
world. These annual reports come in two different forms. 
The first report is called the" Registry of Agricultural Firms of 
the Agricultural and Fisheries Department in the Province of 
Jaen." This data source contains annual information for each 
oil mill for the entire 54-year period. Because inscription in 
the registry is a legal requirement, we had access to the 
entire population of mills in the region. Since 1944, the 
administrators of the registry have gathered and updated 
data annually for each olive mill in situ. If the mill failed to 
cooperate or provided misleading information, it could receive 
major sanctions. The second report is called the "Registry of 
Cooperatives of the Trade and Industry Department in the 
Province of Jaen." This registry provides information on each 
cooperative operating in the region in the same 54-year peri-
od, including a list of firms that decided to join and when. For 
some of the control variables, these two reports were com-
plemented by other data sources, as noted below. 
Measures of Variables 
Loss of control was measured each year as a dichotomous 
variable. An olive oil mill was coded as "1" on this variable 
whenever it voluntarily decided to change status from being 














Risks in Family-controlled Firms 
a privately owned independent firm to being a cooperative, 
an exclusive agreement that transfers power from the mill 
owners to the coop governance structure. We coded all 
those mills that decided to remain independent (i.e., not part 
of a cooperative) in a given year as 0 and those that decided 
to transfer control over to a cooperative as 1 . We used this 
loss of control measure as a dependent variable to test 
hypotheses 1 and 2 using an event history analysis. 
Performance hazard. As noted earlier, performance hazard 
was conceptualized as the possibility of negative outcomes. 
As per our theoretical arguments, family firms prefer to retain 
family control and, hence, preserve their socioemotional 
wealth, even if this means accepting a greater likelihood of 
below-target performance and a greater probability of busi-
ness failure in the future. We measured the performance 
hazard in several ways. 
Because the extent to which an organization meets its per-
formance target cannot be measured directly, we used two 
common proxies to measure the distance between perfor-
mance and target, or attainment discrepancy (eyert and 
Ma rch, 1963). The first one, historical target achievements, 
consists of a comparison of current with past performance. 
From this perspective, the greater the magnitude of perfor-
mance shortfalls, or performance discrepancy, between peri-
ods, the greater the performance hazard. We assessed this 
by a panel data analysis that calculated the percentage 
increase or decrease in tons of olives sold (natural logarithm 
in tons of olives sold at t + 1 divided by tons of olives sold at 
t). A score of 0 means that the target was achieved. The 
magnitude of positive (above 0) or negative (below 0) scores 
indicates the distance from achieving the target. Earning 
records are not available, but because olives can be consid-
ered a commodity, this is a reasonable proxy for whether the 
firm is facing declining (below-target) or increasing (above tar-
get) revenues. 
The second measure of target achievement, referent-target 
achievement. consists of a comparison of the focal firm's 
performance in each time period with the average perfor-
mance of other firms in the sector in the same time period. 
We calculated this variable for each firm as the annual per-
centage difference in tons of olives (in logarithmic form) sold 
by that firm and the average sold by other similar oil mills. 
The resulting magnitude of positive or negative percentage 
scores indicates the extent to which the firm fell behind or 
exceeded the performance target of referent firms in a partic-
ular year. We controlled for the number of employees in all 
equations, as an indicator of firm size. No data were available 
on the number of acres in cultivation. 
The third indicator of performance hazard captures the likeli-
hood that the firm will cease operations in the future. We 
used a standard econometric approach to estimate the proba-
bility of failure, namely, an event history analysis in which the 
endogenous variable is the duration or waiting time until the 
firm disappearance event, if any, occurs. In this kind of analy-
sis, one estimates an instantaneous hazard rate, mathemati-
cally defined as: 
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Where t is the waiting time and r(t) is the probability that an 
olive oil mill fails between t and t + At, given the organization 
was operating at t (see Ingram and Inman, 1996; Barnett, 
1997; Ranger-Moore, 1997; Silverman, Nickerson, and Free-
man, 1997). 
Because there is some debate about the appropriate parame-
trizations of waiting time (lngram and Baum, 1997), we used 
a semiparametric Cox model (Cox, 1972) in which it is not 
necessary to choose any distribution. The standard Cox 
model continues to be the most frequently used model for 
duration data (Powers and Xie, 2000: 174). The expression of 
the hazard rate in this model is: 
Thus, the Cox model depends on an unspecified baseline 
hazard rate, ro(t), and a set of time varying variables xi(t). 13 is 
the vector of parameters to estimate. If 13 has a positive sign, 
the probability of failure will increase, and conversely, if the 
sign is negative, both will decrease. Estimates of the models 
were obtained using maximum partial likelihood in the STATA 
8.0 program (Stata Corporation, 2003). 
Miller and Leiblein (1996) and Miller and Reuer (1996) have 
used the term "downside risk" to refer to the negative semi-
variance of performance outcomes, or the observed devia-
tions of performance outcomes below the performance tar-
get utilizing root lower partial moments. They experimented 
with seven different targets to make this calculation, e.g., 
"firms update their target levels annually and set them equal 
to their own performance the previous year," "firms update 
their target levels annually and set them equal to the average 
performance" in all their sectors in the previous year, and 
such (Miller and Leiblein, 1996: 101-102). We did not use 
these measures for two reasons. First, theoretically it made 
more sense in our study to examine the extent to which fam-
ily firms experienced hazard in the form of lower subsequent 
performance, rather than a negative semi-variance, and a 
higher probability of failure as a price for continued family 
control. Second, we calculated all seven "downside risk" 
measures proposed by Miller and colleagues in our data and 
found that they all load on a single factor, with average inter-
correlations among these measures in the high 90s. Most 
importantly, we found that the performance semi-variance 
(deviations below target) and overall performance variation 
(performance variation above and below target) correlated .87 
(further details on these results are available from the 
authors). Hence, we could not meaningfully differentiate 
between these semi-variance measures and the coefficient 
of variation, which is based on the entire distribution of per-
formance outcomes and which we used as an indicator of 
venturing risk, as noted below. This is not the case, however, 
with our measures of performance hazard, as the correlations 
among themselves and the coefficient of variation are much 
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Risks in Family-controlled Firms 
lower, as reported below, and thus they are not redundant. 
Furthermore, our measures of performance hazard are far 
more parsimonious; using multiple downside-risk measures 
would greatly increase the complexity of the analysis and 
interpretation of results. 
Venturing risk. We calculated the coefficient of variation for 
each firm as a measure of venturing risk by dividing the stan-
dard deviation in tons of olives sold by the average tons of 
olives sold. The coefficient of variation, which normalizes the 
standard deviation of performance by mean performance (cf. 
Miller and Reuer, 1996) is the recommended statistic to iso-
late real risk from other dimensional effects when comparing 
the variability of several batches of data with different distrib-
utions across various time periods (Berenson and Levine, 
1993: 55-56; Nickel and Rodriguez, 2002). As one would 
expect, there is a high correlation between the absolute stan-
dard deviation and the mean corrected standard deviation, or 
the coefficient of variation. An r2 of .71 suggests that these 
measures are largely similar but not redundant. 
Family status. We created two sets of annual variables to 
measure family status at the start of each year. The first one, 
family owned, was measured as 1 if the mill remained in 
family hands or 0 if the mill became part of a cooperative. 
The second one, family stage, was obtained from the registry 
for those mills that were designated as family owned in 
terms of the three mutually exclusive categories described 
above: Family Stage I, corresponding to those that are owned 
and managed by the founding family (1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
Family Stage 11, corresponding to those owned and managed 
by the non-founding extended family (1 if yes, 0 otherwise); 
and Family Stage Ill, corresponding to those owned by the 
non-founding extended family but managed by hired non-fam-
ily executives (1 if yes, 0 otherwise). 
We also included a number of control variables in the study 
that could potentially affect the dependent variables; includ-
ing them in the equations serves to rule out alternative expla-
nations to those that are formally hypothesized. Unless indi-
cated otherwise, all of them were recorded annually from the 
government registries noted above. We controlled for the 
Aggregate supply, a measure of the total annual olive harvest 
(in million kilos) for the entire country, capturing the status of 
the commodity supply market for olives on a national level in 
a particular year. Relatedly, for each year, we also calculated 
the standard deviation of the aggregate supply for the prior 
five years, which serves as a proxy for cyclical gyrations at 
the industry level. Ownership of means of production is a 
dummy variable that captures whether the firm owns its 
plant and equipment (coded as 1) or leases it (coded as 0). 
Organizational size is the number of workers employed by 
the oil mill. We controlled for technology with three mea-
sures recorded in the registry that reflect the mill's techno-
logical sophistication. Use of traditional technology means 
that oil is obtained by mechanically pressing the olives (coded 
1 for yes, and 0 for no). Use of advanced technology means 
that the mill uses more sophisticated centrifugation equip-
ment to extract the oil, recorded as a dummy (1 if yes, 0 if 
no). We included both types of extraction methods because 
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an oil mill could use more than one in its production process. 
The third technology-related variable, degree of mechaniza-
tion, indicates the potential productivity of workers, mea-
sured as the ratio of the mill's installed power to the number 
of employees. 
Density is the total number of olive oil mills in the population 
at a national level at the start of each year and controls for 
one source of intrapopulation competition (Hannan, 1989). 
Institutional support is a control variable that captures the 
transfer of funds from the government to cooperatives, 
which varies by historical periods in the 54-year time span. 
Because the actual amount was not available to us, we mea-
sured it as a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if subsidies 
were provided during the particular time in question and 0 
otherwise. We controlled for organization age by measuring 
the number of years elapsed since a firm's founding and the 
beginning of the focal year, which is necessary to overcome 
truncated data in lifetime models (Carroll and Hannan, 2000); 
for family firms, it also implicitly controls for family tenure. 
We used a dummy variable, Franco era, to capture the politi-
cal regime in power at the time. During the conservative 
reign of Generalissimo Francisco Franco from 1939 to 1975 
(coded as 1) the country was run in a dictatorial centralized 
fashion. Upon his death in 1975, Spain became a representa-
tive democracy (coded as 0). Number of previous coop trans-
formations, the total number of olive oil mills that have joined 
a coop in the focal firm's district during the prior five years, 
serves as a proxy for highly localized norms and practices 
concerning coop membership. The entire province of Jaen, 
which has 7,288.33 square miles, is divided into nine dis-
tricts. Gross national product is a macroeconomic variable 
that serves as an indicator of the country's wealth for each 
year included in the study. Cubic meters (M3) of rainwater. 
the availability of rainwater for each year considered in the 
study, serves as a proxy for nature's role in facilitating or hin-
dering (during dry spells) the cultivation of olives. The annual 
cubic meters of rainwater for the Province of Jaen was 
obtained from Spain's National Institute of Meteorology. 
Endogeneity. Firms may face unchosen risks as a conse-
quence of unobservable organizational or environmental char-
acteristics that are not captured in the control variables 
included in the model (for general discussion concerning 
endogeneity, see Heckman, 1979; Hsiao, 1998; Hamilton and 
Nickerson, 2003). Heckman (1979) demonstrated that this 
problem can be tackled by including the inverse of Mill's ratio 
in the models as a control variable. To calculate this variable, 
we have followed the empirical application developed by 
Shaver (1998: 581): we estimated one probit model for each 
period, in which family (coded as 1) versus non-family firm 
(coded as 0) is the endogenous variable. If we consider that 
these models have the following structure, Family firm/Non-
family firm = y'w + E, we can calculate the new control vari-
able as a function of the following criteria: 
Endogeneity control = $(y'w)/$(y'w). if the firm is family owned. 












Risks in Family-controlled Firms 
Endogeneity control = ..p(y'w)/[1 - cp(y'w)l. if the firm is not family 
owned. 
The exogenous variables (w) in these models refer to the 
unobserved characteristics that may influence observed risk-
taking behaviors. 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the intercorrelation matrix for all variables 
among family-owned mills. Table 3 presents the equivalent 
intercorrelation matrix for all firms that are not family owned. 
Because data are recorded for each separate year, the corre-
lation matrices are calculated based on the mean score for 
each variable for every firm during the 54-year period. These 
tables show that for both samples, the probability of failure 
decreases as the coefficient of variation decreases and (his-
torical and referent) target achievement improves. The nega-
tive association between firm size and the probability of fail-
ure in both samples suggests that size provides oil mills with 
slack resources to weather threatening conditions, a finding 
consistent with earlier work by organization theorists (Jones, 
1998). The correlation between loss of control with probabili-
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Family-owned Olive Oil Mills* 
Variable Mean 5.0. .2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Probability of failure .10 .06 
2. Coefficient of variation .05 .18 -.21 
3. Control loss .001 .0001 .07 -.01 
4. Historical target achievement .01 .10 -.18 .37 -.03 
5. Referent target achievement -.34 .61 -.60 .14 .01 .08 
6. Aggregate supply (millions) 568555 329763 -.10 .11 -.27 .04 -.10 
7. Ownership of means of production .79 .40 -.08 -.00 .12 -.00 .04 -.04 
8. Organization size 9.00 7.61 -.27 .05 .02 .02 .48 .07 .02 
9. Use of traditional technology .95 .21 .19 -.13 .16 -.04 .05 -.32 .00 -.10 
10. Use of advanced technology .02 .16 -.26 .12 -.15 .04 -.02 .35 -.00 .00 -.77 
11. Degree of mechanization 4.41 6.02 -.31 .15 -.21 .07 -.03 .43 .01 -.10 -.56 
12. Density (thousands) 833.63 256.40 -.23 -.11 -.01 -.04 .10 -.48 .00 -.12 .32 
13. Institutional support .60 .48 -.28 -.11 .39 -.02 .06 -.26 -.02 -.09 .20 
14. Organization's age 36.54 22.55 -.15 .09 -.48 .04 -.08 .20 -.07 .07 -.10 
15. Franco era .85 .34 .05 -.12 .35 -.05 .13 -.57 .06 -.12 .40 
16. Number of previous coop 
transformations .43 .88 -.17 -.03 .54 -.00 .03 -.08 -.03 -.03 .07 
17. Gross national product 21185.8 16436 -.13 .17 -.51 .07 -.18 .63 -.10 .12 -.42 
18. M3 of rainwater 555.13 177.35 -.08 .00 -.14 .00 -.01 .23 -.04 -.01 .01 
19. Aggregate supply standard deviation 210477 98468 -.10 .11 -.24 .04 -.10 .51 -.01 .05 -.29 
20. Endogeneity control -.01 .05 .06 .01 .02 .02 -.00 .03 .05 .01 -.04 
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
11. Degree of mechanization .64 
12. Density (thousands) -.33 -.42 
13. Institutional support -.21 -.26 .82 
14. Organization's age .10 .15 -.21 -.12 
15. Franco era -.42 -.51 .75 .50 -.27 
16. Number of previous coop 
transformations -.07 -.09 .37 .35 -.04 .18 
17. Gross national product .45 .56 -.73 -.47 .34 -.84 -.16 
18. M3 of rainwater -.01 -.01 .13 .12 -02 -.01 -.01 .01 
19. Aggregate supply standard deviation .31 .36 -.35 -.21 .15 -.45 -.12 .50 .00 
20. Endogeneity control .04 .05 -.17 -.17 -.04 -.10 -.06 .08 -.04 .03 
* Correlations ~ 1.011 are significant at p < .00001. 
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Table 3 
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Non-Family Owned Olive Oil Mills* 
Variable Mean S.D. .2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Probability of failure .05 .06 
2. Coefficient of variation .13 .25 -.27 
3. Control loss .10 .00 .23 .10 
4. Historical target achievement .03 .17 -.18 .33 -.26 
5. Referent target achievement .07 .70 -.62 .24 .03 .13 
6. Aggregate supply (millions) 829619 472732 -.24 .09 -.24 .03 -.12 
7. Ownership of means of production .91 .28 -.23 .05 .13 .03 .15 .07 
8. Organization size 16.79 14.40 -.28 -.01 -.02 .00 .60 -.07 .13 
9. Use of traditional technology .73 .44 .44 -.20 .21 -.07 -.01 -.47 -.11 .12 
10. Use of advanced technology .20 .40 -.38 .17 -.18 .06 -.08 .44 .09 -.19 -.83 
11. Degree of mechanization 10.73 13.89 -.41 .22 -.20 .09 .03 .52 .07 -.22 -.72 
12. Density (thousands) 606.23 307.34 .14 -.06 -.01 -.00 .18 -.55 -.14 .02 .49 
13. Institutional support .32 .46 .06 -.03 .36 -.00 .15 -.44 -.13 -.00 .39 
14. Organization's age 38.60 26.23 .02 .01 -.27 .00 -.23 .18 -.04 -.13 -.06 
15. Franco era .48 .49 .23 -.09 .34 -.02 .17 -.57 -.12 .06 .54 
16. Number of previous coop 
transformations .28 .73 .04 -.00 .62 .01 .05 -.18 -.04 -.02 .18 
17. Gross national product 40777 20670 -.30 .11 -.42 .03 -.18 .68 .11 -.07 -.63 
18. M3 of rainwater 559.04 163.69 .01 -.01 -.06 -.02 .02 .16 -.04 -.01 .08 
19. Aggregate supply standard deviation 267699 140293 -.26 .14 -.24 .03 -.10 .69 .05 -.08 -.42 
20. Endogeneity control .03 .34 .04 .01 -.28 .06 -.04 -.06 -.06 -.04 .05 
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
11. Degree of mechanization .69 
12. Density (thousands) -.44 -.48 
13. Institutional support -.34 -.38 .92 
14. Organization's age .03 .08 -.24 -.21 
15. Franco era -.48 -.52 .85 .70 -.23 
16. Number of previous coop 
transformations -.16 -.18 .44 .45 -.08 .33 
17. Gross national product .57 .65 -.88 -.75 .27 -.85 -.36 
18. M3 of rainwater -.06 -.05 .20 .25 -.03 .05 .04 -.14 
19. Aggregate supply standard deviation .38 .45 -.37 -.23 .15 -.48 -.15 .55 .15 
20. Endogeneity control -.04 -.05 .12 .11 .00 .09 .24 -.10 .00 -.05 
* Correlations ~ 1.011 are significant at p < .00001. 
ty of failure (positive) and historical target achievement (nega-
tive) tends to be higher among non-family-owned olive oil 
mills than among those that are family owned (the differ-
ences are statistically significant at p < .001). This suggests, 
consistent with our hypotheses, that non-family firms are 
more willing to give up control in order to reduce the perfor-
mance hazard. 
In testing hypothesis 1, that family firms will prefer to retain 
control, the dependent variable was loss of control (i.e., join-
ing the coop), and the predictor of interest was whether the 
firm was family owned (coded as 0) or not (coded as 1). The 
event history analysis using a Cox model summarized in 
model 1 of table 4 shows that there is a strong negative rela-
tionship between family ownership and willingness to cede 
control (p < .0001), which provides strong support for hypoth-
esis 1. 
In testing hypothesis 2, the dependent variable was also loss 
of control (i.e., joining the coop), and the three predictors of 
interest corresponded to each of the family stages. In a Cox 
model, this hypothesis would be supported if the coefficient 
were negative and showed a statistically significant declining 
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Table 4 
Cox Models Predicting Control Loss (Joining a Coop) of Olive Oil Mills Based on Family Status* 
Variable 
1. Probability of failure 
2. Historical target achievement 
3. Referent target achievement 
4. Aggregate supply (millions) 
5. Aggregate supply S.D. (millions) 
6. Ownership of means of production 
7. Organization size 
8. Use of traditional technology 
9. Use of advanced technology 
10. Degree of mechanization 
11. Density (thousands) 
12. Institutional support 
13. Organization age/lOO 








































































16. Gross national product 
17. M3 of rainwater 
18. Family owned 
19. Family Stage I 
20. Family Stage II 
21. Family Stage III 
x2 













- P 5. .05; .. P 5. .01; - P 5. .001; - P 5. .0001. 
* Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
magnitude moving from Stage I (founding-family-controlled 
and managed) to Stage II (non-founding extended family 
owned and managed) to Stage III (extended family owned 
and professionally managed). As shown in model 2 of table 
4, there is strong support for hypothesis 2. There is a declin-
ing magnitude in the loss-of-control coefficients, meaning 
that more firms are willing to join the coop as one moves 
from Stage I (row 19) to Stage II (row 20) to Stage III (row 
21). The differences in magnitude between the three coeffi-
cients (i.e., one for each family stage) are statistically signifi-
cant at p < .0001. Though different in their magnitude, as 
hypotheses 2 predicted, all three family coefficients are also 
negative and highly statistically significant, which is consis-
tent with hypothesis 1. 
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Table 5 
Table 4 also shows that there is a very strong positive rela-
tionship between the number of previous coop transforma-
tions in a particular district (row 15) with a focal firm's deci-
sion to join a coop. This suggests that local norms play an 
important role in these decisions, although family status 
exerts a strong independent effect even after partialling out 
the influence of this and other control variables. 
To test hypotheses 3a, 3b.1, and 3b.2, we calculated three 
regression models, corresponding to the three performance 
hazard measures as dependent variables, as shown in mod-
els 1-3 in table 5. The first is a Cox model in which the 
dependent variable is probability of failure at t + 1 and the 
predictor is whether or not the family-owned firm chose to 
remain independent (i.e., retain control) or join the coopera-
tive (i.e., relinquish control) at t. The second and third models 
in table 5 consist of a data panel regression predicting histori-
cal (model 2) and referent (model 3) target achievement at 
Performance Hazard Assumed by Olive Oil Mills Based on Family Ownership* 
Variable 
1. Aggregate supply (millions) 
2. Aggregate supply S.D. (millions) 
3. Ownership of means of production 
4. Organization size 
5. Use of traditional technology 
6. Use of advanced technology 
7. Degree of mechanization 
8. Density (thousands) 
9. Institutional support 
10. Organization age 
11. Franco era 
12. Number of previous coop 
transformations 
13. Gross national product 
14. M3 of rainwater 
15. Endogeneity control 
16. Family owned 
17. Constant 
Cox regressions Data panel regressions Data panel regressions 
predicting probability predicting historical target Predicting referent target 
of failure achievement achievement 








































































































16 Degree of freedom 16 
- p~ .05;" p~ .01; - p~ .001; - p~ .0001. 
* Standard errors appear in parentheses. 












• . ; . ; - . ; - . .
i
Risks in Family-controlled Firms 
t + 1; as in the first regression, the predictor of interest is 
continued family control versus relinquishing control by join-
ing the coop at t. These three sub-hypotheses would be sup-
ported in table 5 if the coefficient for the family-owned vari-
able were positive for probability of failure (model 1) and 
negative for the two target achievement measures (models 2 
and 3), meaning that the family firm faces a greater perfor-
mance hazard by choosing to retain control instead of joining 
the coop. The results in table 5 show that there is strong 
empirical support for all three sub-hypotheses. If the family 
chooses to retain control of the firm, it faces a dual peril: the 
probability of failure is much higher, and target achievement 
tends to be much worse, either in comparison to the firm's 
past performance or relative to the performance of referent 
firms. 
Hypothesis 4 proposed a U-shaped relationship between ven-
turing risks (as measured by the coefficient of variation) and 
divergence from the aspiration level (as measured by the dis-
crepancy in percentage terms between performance at t + 1 
and performance at t, the target achievement, which of 
course would be negative if performance declines and posi-
tive if performance improves. To test this hypothesis, we cal-
culated a data panel regression by first entering the two tar-
get achievement measures, historical and referent, and then 
their squared term as independent variables, with the coeffi-
cient of variation as the dependent variable. The results for 
the squared target achievement measures in rows 19 and 20 
of table 6 show that the non-linear relationship between tar-
get achievement and the coefficient of variation is highly sig-
nificant for both historical and referent attainment 
discrepancy. 
Hypothesis 5, which proposed an inverse relationship 
between the probability of failure and the coefficient of varia-
tion, also finds strong support in table 6. In contrast to the 
study by Miller and Chen (2004), this provides strong support 
to March and Shapira's notion that investments in projects 
with higher outcome variance (i.e., venturing risks) diminish 
as the threat to survival increases. Because family-owned 
firms are expected to have a higher probability of failure (as 
per hypothesis 3a), we would then expect to find that these 
firms would show a lower coefficient of variation than non-
family firms. This prediction, formalized in hypothesis 6, finds 
strong support in row 21 of table 6. 
Hypothesis 7 tests whether family ownership moderates the 
expectations of the behavioral model (as per hypothesis 4) of 
a non-linear relationship between distance from the aspiration 
level (or target achievement) and risk taking (as measured by 
the coefficient of variation). This relationship finds strong sup-
port in the corresponding interaction term for historical target 
achievement and family ownership shown in row 23 of table 
6. This interaction is plotted in figure 1, with distance to his-
torical target achievement along the horizontal axis and the 
coefficient of variation along the vertical axis. While both fam-
ily and non-family curves in figure 1 have a shape similar to 
that reported by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988). the curve 
relating venturing risks (coefficient of variation) to distance to 
the historical performance target is lower for family than non-
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Table 6 
Panel Regression Predicting Venturing Risks Assumed by Olive Oil Mills Based on Family Ownership* 
Predictor variable 
1. Probability of failure 
2. Historical target achievement 
3. Referent target achievement 
4. Aggregate supply (millions) 
5. Aggregate supply S.D. (millions) 
6. Ownership of means of production 
7. Organization size 
8. Use of traditional technology 
9. Use of advanced technology 
10. Degree of mechanization 
11. Density (thousands) 
12. Institutional support 
13. Organization's age 
14. Franco era 
15. Number of previous coop transformations 
16. Gross national product 
17. M3 of rainwater 
18. Endogeneity control 
19. Historical target achievement2 
20. Referent target achievement2 
21. Family owned 
22. Historical target achievement x Family owned 
23. Historical target achievemene x Family owned 
24. Referent target achievement x Family owned 
25. Referent target achievement2 x Family owned 
26. Constant 
x2 
Degree of freedom 
• p~ .05;" p~ .01; - p~ .001; - p~ .0001. 
* Standard errors appear in parentheses. 























































family firms. As can be seen in row 25 of table 6, the interac-
tion term is not statistically significant when target achieve-
ment is measured in terms of discrepancy from the perfor-
mance of referent firms. 



















Risks in Family-controlled Firms 









-3 -2 -1 2 3 
Historical Target Achievement 
- Non-Family Firms - Family Firm 
* For both figures, the historical target achievement (horizontal axis) corresponds to percentage changes in 
tons of olives sold (which could be either positive or negative) between t and t+ 1, with 0 = target achievement 
or no observed changes, 1 = 100% change, 2 = 200% change, 3 = 300% change, and 4 = 400% change. 
DISCUSSION 
We have argued that family firms frame the relinquishing of 
socioemotional endowment as a major loss and, consistent 
with a behavioral perspective, are willing to accept a greater 
performance hazard to mitigate that loss. This is in contrast 
to much of the prior literature, which has proposed that as a 
result of highly concentrated undiversified assets, family 
firms are more risk averse. Specifically, we have shown that 
when family firms are faced with a strategic choice dilemma 
that involves (1) a high degree of certainty of improved finan-
cial gains and a better probability of survival, but loss of fami-
ly control (i.e., joining the coop), and (2) a greater risk of 
declining performance and catastrophic business failure, but 
retention of family control (i.e., choosing to remain indepen-
dent and not join the coop), the clear winner is the "risk will-
ing" decision. At the same time, these firms tend to avoid 
investments that increase their performance variability even 
under a negative framing (performance lower than a historical 
referent point), as this might exacerbate the performance 
hazard that they have freely accepted in exchange for contin-
ued family control. 
More fine-grained findings of this study also support the 
above interpretation. Namely, our results show that willing-
ness to give up family control is lowest in those stages in 
which family influence is strongest, when socioemotional 
endowment is highest. And consistent with our predictions, 
additional analysis (available upon request) shows that as 
economic prospects worsen relative to past performance, the 
family firm becomes more reluctant to join the coop, and 
129/Asa, March 2007 
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lose control of the organization, than non-family firms. That 
is, family firms take bad or seemingly irrational risks to miti-
gate threats to their socioemotional wealth. Relatedly, our 
study supports behavioral predictions (cf. Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas, 1988) that as firms deviate from the reference 
point, they are more willing to invest in uncertain projects 
(i.e., those with high performance variance) and March and 
Shapira's hypothesis that as the probability of failure increas-
es, firms become more conservative. But the sensitivity of 
the performance variance to the distance from the historical 
performance target is lower among family than non-family 
firms, and family firms are less willing to engage in projects 
with high outcome variance (i.e., they exhibit lower venturing 
risk) than non-family firms. 
Much of the literature in entrepreneurship suggests that 
"risks-perceived and real-abound at every stage of the 
entrepreneurial process" (Zahra, 2005: 25). Presumably, this 
should be more evident at the founding-family stage. In our 
study, we did not find significant differences by family stage 
for any of the business risk measures (results available upon 
request). Perhaps this is due to the fact that many of the 
founders in our sample are" necessity entrepreneurs," who 
become business owners because other employment 
options are either absent or unsatisfactory, rather than 
"opportunity entrepreneurs," who try to exploit a perceived 
business opportunity. 
We reinterpreted much of the prior findings and theoretical 
justification for those findings, which argued that family firms 
are inherently more risk averse because of undiversified 
wealth. Based on our theoretical logic and empirical results, 
we suggest that this is not the case. In fact, results suggest 
that these firms are willing to accept a performance hazard in 
order to retain family control and, in doing so, avoid high vari-
ance projects that might exacerbate this hazard. We also 
expand research on prospect theory and the behavioral theo-
ry of the firm into a new domain, incorporating notions of 
socioemotional utility in how decisions are framed within the 
context of family firms. Our findings have important practical 
implications, because organizational risk preferences may 
affect new product introductions, capital expenditures, entry 
into new markets, the willingness to use non-traditional 
methods, investment policies, and the like (Larraza-Kintana et 
al.,2007). 
Having access to 54 years of data for 1,237 firms allowed us 
to circumvent the drawbacks associated with much of the 
cross-sectional research on risk taking in general and family 
firms in particular. We were able to examine longitudinally 
how these firms responded in terms of venturing risks (i.e., 
observed variability in outcomes) when faced with below-tar-
get performance and a high probability of failure. Further, this 
study is one of a few on corporate governance issues that 
uses non-conventional data from an international setting, in 
contrast to heavily mined U.s.-centric data. This takes on 
added value given the paucity of rigorous studies on family 
firms (Dyer, 2003). The dominance of family firms in absolute 
numbers and as a percentage of business around the world 
suggests that more research and knowledge of family busi-
130/ASQ, March 2007 
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Risks in Family-controlled Firms 
nesses could be critical to economic development on a global 
basis. 
One implication of this study is that family firms may be just 
as rational as non-family firms when it comes to making risky 
business decisions. Yet the criteria for judging whether the 
decision is risky varies by the two types of firms. For family 
firms, a key criterion, or at least one that has a greater priori-
ty, is whether their socioemotional endowment will be pre-
served. And as we have shown here, these firms are quite 
willing to face a greater performance hazard so as not to 
jeopardize that endowment. For non-family firms, financial cri-
teria seem to be most important when it comes to assessing 
the value of a business decision, as they are less driven by 
the need to protect their socioemotional endowment. 
Our study suggests that we need to reinterpret the argu-
ments and empirical findings of March and Shapira (1987), 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988). Wiseman and Bromiley 
(1996), and Miller and Chen (2004), among others, given that 
predictions about risk-taking behaviors depend on the type of 
risk on which the entity examined focuses. For instance, a 
firm that performs below target takes riskier actions, as evi-
denced by greater performance variability, to prevent financial 
losses (see Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988). Yet family firms 
are willing to risk financial losses and bear a greater probabili-
ty of failure in order to maintain control of the firm. Both 
types of firms are taking major risks, hoping not to fail, 
although the nature of the risk and the referent point being 
used (financial versus socioemotional) are very different. This 
suggests that behavioral and agency models should be 
expanded to consider the role of non-financial issues (for 
related discussion, see Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman, and Johnson 
Dykes, 2005; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2007). 
The differences between family and non-family firms report-
ed here cannot be satisfactorily explained by standard eco-
nomic accounts of a firm's behavior. Using the terminology of 
Meyer and Zucker (1990: 68). it seems that many family 
firms live in a state of "permanent failure," which they define 
as "a condition characterized by sustained low performance 
and high persistence." Perhaps family firms are able to do 
this because they have access to what some refer to as 
patient capital or survivability capital (see Sirmon and Hitt, 
2003) that other firms may be unable to access. For instance, 
these firms may be able to call on extended family members 
for help in times of crisis, hire relatives who are willing to 
work at below-market wages (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, 
and Makri, 2003). or receive a loan from the collective pool of 
family savings as needed so that the firm does not have to 
tap independent debt holders who want the debt repaid 
along with interest in a specified period of time. Even if this 
were the case, however, the probability of failure of family 
firms is higher than that of non-family firms. 
Cyert and March (1963) hypothesized that firms set their 
aspirations or targets based on their own past performance 
and the experience of referent firms, but as Miller and Chen 
(2004) noted, "it remains unclear how firms weigh their own 
performance and the performance of other firms when deter-
131/Asa, March 2007 
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mining their aspiration level." In general, we found that 
attainment discrepancy relative to the firm's own past perfor-
mance is a better predictor of venturing risks and serves to 
distinguish better between the behaviors of family and non-
family firms. Perhaps the relatively simple firms in this study 
prefer to use a rule of thumb of "how well we are doing now 
in comparison to how well we did before" when considering 
risky decisions, market data on the performance of referent 
firms may be difficult to find, or these firms are less con-
cerned with market pressure because they are not publicly 
traded. 
This study has some important limitations. These include the 
absence of information about ownership distribution within 
each firm, potential problems with extending findings beyond 
the boundaries of one industry in a particular region of the 
world, reliance on archival data sources to infer reasons as to 
why firms behave in a particular manner, and the use of rela-
tively simple firms, which may raise concerns about general-
izability. At the same time, most of these limitations have a 
"silver lining," as discussed earlier, for instance, greater con-
trol of confounding variables and access to a large sample 
over a long period of time. They also raise several interesting 
issues that provide fertile ground for future research. 
Explaining the anomalies. As in most social science 
research, the main conclusions of this study pertain to group 
differences (e.g., family vs. non-family firms) on the variables 
of interest (e.g., remaining autonomous versus joining a 
coop). And while the observed differences may be highly sig-
nificant, the exceptions to the general trend may be just as 
intriguing and theoretically important. Although they consti-
tute a smaller proportion, there are many family firms, includ-
ing some that should be at the high end of socioemotional 
endowment (such as those in the founding-family stage) that 
appear to make business decisions with financial rather than 
socioemotional criteria in mind. This raises the question of 
what explains the behavior of those that do not fit the norm. 
Are there some unique attributes in terms of leadership style, 
educational background, personality traits, or family dynamics 
that explain why some family firms are capable of making 
business decisions with financial rather than socioemotional 
criteria in mind? It is also possible that a firm's choice about 
remaining independent or joining the coop may be partly a 
product of earlier strategic decisions (e.g., land purchases) or 
resource availability (e.g., inherited family wealth) that could 
not be considered in this study because the data are not 
available. 
Self justification. Our study shows that many family firms 
consciously make a decision that places the organization at 
peril of total ruin through its failure to survive, which of 
course would imply not only the disappearance of all firm-
specific socioemotional endowment but also the loss of 
financial assets. Beyond the cognitive arguments advanced in 
this paper to explain this behavior, family executives may 
engage in self-delusion or believe that they have more con-
trol over the situation than they really have, thereby failing to 
gauge the true risks involved. As March and Shapira (1987: 
1404) noted, based on field interviews with managers, "deci-
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sion makers sometimes deny risk, saying that there is no risk 
or that it is so small that it can be ignored. A common form 
of denial involves acceptance of the actuarial reality of the 
risk combined with a refusal to associate that reality with 
one's self." Perhaps the felt need to preserve the socioemo-
tional endowment in family firms reinforces this tendency to 
see risk as controllable and as a danger applicable to some-
one else. Hence, these family executives may be guided by a 
false sense of security, confident that risk is manageable and 
that they can muster the skills and information needed to 
reduce uncertainty. 
Contextual ambiguity. One of the strengths of the present 
study is that information about the financial benefits and the 
risk-reduction properties of a particular strategic choice (i.e., 
joining the coop) are well known to the firms involved. The 
loss of family control associated with that strategic choice is 
also plain for everyone to see. Hence when a firm foregoes 
the advantages of that strategic choice (i.e., coop member-
ship) in order to maintain independence (and thus bear 
greater risks). the decision cannot be blamed on ignorance or 
faulty data. Of course, in most cases, the decision choice is 
not as clear cut as it is for olive oil mills. Decisions concern-
ing R&D investments, entering new markets, capital expendi-
tures, debt financing, and the like involve more ambiguity in 
terms of the associated financial risks, returns, and potential 
loss of family control (Makri, Lane, and Gomez-Mejia, 2006). 
It would be useful to reconsider the hypotheses and empiri-
cal findings of this study by taking into account contextual 
ambiguity, for instance, if family firms become more risk 
averse or risk willing in their business decisions when the 
threat to socioemotional wealth is vague and difficult to dis-
cern. 
Multiple stakeholders. The organizations included in this 
study are relatively simple. Though we did not have precise 
ownership data for each family member, there is little doubt 
in our mind that the family, either in its nuclear or extended 
form, was the sole firm owner. By contrast, as documented 
by Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003). the typi-
cal large family firm in North America tends to be rather 
heterogeneous in its ownership structure, often involving 
institutional investors, banks, and non-family owners, all of 
whom are residual risk bearers and residual claimants. These 
parties as well as capital markets may exert their own unique 
influence over family and non-family firms. As an extension 
of the current study, it would be interesting to analyze the 
extent to which mixed ownership configurations affect the 
family firm's business risk decisions in tandem with concerns 
about its socioemotional endowment. 
Innovation. Most of the literature on family firms and innova-
tion we discussed earlier suggests that family firms are less 
innovative because they prefer to avoid the risk of failure 
associated with the new and untried. In fact, Morck and 
Yeung (2003: 377) claimed that low business innovativeness 
and family dominance go hand in hand and that" old, mon-
eyed families block creative destruction among their own 
firms." One question that arises in the context of this study 
is if lower levels of innovation result from the fear of losing 
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